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MAKE THEM HEAR YOU: PARTICIPATORY DEFENSE AND
THE STRUGGLE FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE REFORM*
Janet Moore,** Marla Sandys,*** & Raj Jayadev****
I. INTRODUCTION
This article introduces participatory defense as a powerful new
model for reforming public defense and challenging mass
incarceration. Participatory defense amplifies the voices of the key
stakeholders—people who face criminal charges, their families, and
their communities—in the struggle for system reform.
Participatory defense empowers these key stakeholders to
transform themselves from recipients of services provided by
lawyers and other professionals into change agents who force
greater transparency, accountability, and fairness from criminal
justice systems.
As a grassroots response to the public defense crisis, participatory
defense offers new insights and perspectives that are unavailable
through reform models described as client-centered, holistic, and
community-oriented.1 To be sure, when those models are supported
with adequate resources for implementation, they can dramatically
improve the “meet-’em-and-plead-’em” norms that infect many
overloaded, underfunded public defense systems.2 Nevertheless,

* This article was reviewed by graduate student editors from the University at Albany’s
School of Criminal Justice under the supervision of Andrew Davies, Ph.D., and the
Professional Board of Editors for Miscarriages of Justice. Because of the interdisciplinary
nature of this special issue, the citations in this article use an APA-based alternative to the
Bluebook: A Uniform System of Citations. “Make Them Hear You” is the title of a song in the
musical Ragtime (lyrics by Lynn Ahrens and music by Stephen Flaherty).
** Assistant Professor of Law, University of Cincinnati College of Law
*** Associate Professor, Department of Criminal Justice, Indiana University
**** Executive Director, Silicon Valley De-Bug, a collaborative that is based in San Jose,
California, and is home to the Albert Cobarrubias Justice Project
1 See, e.g., Community Oriented Defender. (2010). Statement of principles. New York, NY:
Brennan Center for Justice. Retrieved from https://www.brennancenter.org/analysis/communi
ty-oriented-defender-cod-statement-principles; Lee, C. G., Ostrom, B. J., & Kleiman, M.
(2015). The measure of good lawyering: Evaluating holistic defense in practice. Albany Law
Review, 78, 1215–1238.
2 See, e.g., Wilbur v. City of Mt. Vernon, 989 F. Supp. 2d 1122 (W.D. Wash. 2013).
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participatory defense examines justice systems from a different set
of perspectives—from the perspectives of the people who are facing
charges, their loved ones, and their communities.
Part II introduces the principles and goals of the participatory
defense movement. Parts III through VI analyze participatory
defense from doctrinal, theoretical, and empirical perspectives.
Part III connects participatory defense with the crisis-ridden
constitutional history of the right to counsel, and with that
doctrine’s deep roots in the due process right to be heard. Part IV
frames participatory defense within a democracy-enhancing theory
of criminal justice. This approach emphasizes equality in the
generation and administration of the governing law, and pairs
effective self-governance with a shrinking carceral state. Part V
applies these insights to recent reform litigation and policy
advocacy, arguing that reformers should invoke due process and use
new evidence of system failure that is exposed by the participatory
defense movement. Part VI offers additional ways to obtain that
evidence through rights-information and satisfaction-feedback tools.
II. PARTICIPATORY DEFENSE: COMMUNITY ORGANIZING FOR REFORM
Participatory defense is a powerful community organizing model
for people who face criminal charges as well as for their families
and their communities. The term was coined by Raj Jayadev, a
coauthor of this article, and describes a collective, grassroots effort
begun in 2007 to improve public defense and check the spread of
mass incarceration. The movement’s success has led Jayadev to
train defenders and communities around the country on its core
principles and strategies, with the goal of embedding the approach
into a national, reform-oriented culture. This article aims to spread
the message while offering doctrinal, theoretical, and empirical
analysis of this new approach to justice reform.
The first step of the participatory defense movement is for people
who face criminal charges, their families, and their communities to
transform themselves from service recipients to change agents. As
discussed below in Parts II.A–C, they do so through three forms of
mutual support. The first form of support is the family justice hub,
where community members guide and coach each other through the
stress, confusion, and frustration of confronting criminal charges.
The second form of support changes “time served to time saved” as
community members help defenders obtain the best possible
outcome in specific cases. The third form of support is public
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protest and celebrations, through which community members
expose systemic flaws, force systemic change, and honor
transformational successes.
These core principles and strategies of participatory defense are
an evolution in public defense. They allow people facing charges,
their families, and their communities to reciprocate and strengthen
efforts of client-centered, holistic, and community-oriented
defenders. They do so in two interrelated ways. First, participatory
defense shifts the focus more fully from the agency of lawyers and
other professionals to the agency of people and communities harmed
most directly by the public defense crisis. Second, participatory
defense offers a broader set of goals.
Participatory defense aims to rebalance power disparities in
criminal justice systems.
The movement forces greater
transparency, accountability, and fairness from those systems for
the people who have disproportionately high system contact, but
disproportionately little voice in system creation and
administration. Pivoting perspective on the identity of systems
changers and what they can do—empowering the millions who face
prison or jail each day along with their families and their
communities through participatory defense—can transform people
from fodder being fed into the criminal justice machine into change
agents fated to bring the era of mass incarceration to its rightful
end.
A. Family Justice Hubs
The best way to understand participatory defense is to
participate. Opportunities arise each week during family justice
hub meetings. These meetings occur at community centers and
churches, and are coordinated through the Albert Cobarrubias
Justice Project of Silicon Valley De-Bug in San Jose, California. DeBug is a cutting-edge collaborative through which people use media,
entrepreneurship, and politically-savvy advocacy to improve lives,
strengthen communities, and promote justice reform.3
On entering a De-Bug family justice hub meeting, you might see
thirteen-year-old Tony sitting shyly at the edge of a conference table
next to his mother. Tony was just released after ninety-nine days in
3 De-Bug was engaged with the meetings and family organizing for several years when, in
2010, one of their members, Albert Cobarrubias, was killed in a random act of violence. DeBug named the project after Albert so he would be present in each step forward toward
greater justice.
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juvenile hall. He responds respectfully to the “congratulations” and
“welcome homes” directed to him from strangers around the table.
Although these supporters have never met Tony, they know him
through his mother’s stories and from seeing his name on the family
justice hub whiteboard.
These meetings connect families whose loved ones are facing
criminal charges. Tony is participating in the first of several
ceremonies that were created by and are distinctive to the
participatory defense movement. When a family brings a loved one
home by helping defense lawyers obtain dismissals, acquittals, or a
reduced sentence, the loved ones erase their names from the
whiteboard.
The crowd of twenty people breaks into applause when Tony
takes the eraser to his name. Tony’s mother thanks the community
who walked with her and her son through the darkest ninety-nine
days of their lives. She is in tears. Tony was facing years of
incarceration, but due to her advocacy and the public defender’s
lawyering, her son will be able to have his fourteenth birthday at
home.
If tradition holds, Tony’s mother will continue attending the
family justice hub meetings. She will help other families who find
themselves in the frightening, stressful, and confusing position she
once occupied. She will share with them what she learned from
others in the participatory defense movement.
There is tremendous power in bringing a community organizing
ethos to the otherwise deeply isolating experience of facing charges
in a criminal or juvenile courtroom. The family justice hub
meetings are now facilitated by people who first came for their own
cases or cases involving their loved ones.
The process has
transformed volunteers like Gail Noble and Blanca Bosquez. Once
isolated, anguished mothers who felt forced to sit idly as their sons
were chewed up by the courts, Gail and Blanca are now vocal
advocates who encourage other families and help them navigate
daunting, complicated court processes. They travel and train
communities across the country, speaking as both mothers and
organizers who have learned the power and possibility of
participatory defense.
In light of those developments, it is important to emphasize that
the participatory defense movement has never conducted outreach
to drum up attendance at the family justice hub meetings. People
usually hear about the meetings from other families, often when
they are visiting their loved ones at the local jail. There is a
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common yearning among these families for support and help
navigating criminal justice systems. They also share an inclination
for discovering ways to help change the outcome of their loved one’s
case.
It also is important to emphasize that family justice hub meetings
are not legal clinics. There are no lawyers in the room. In many
respects, that is the point of this new reform model. From a
movement-building perspective, the case outcome is not the only
measuring stick. Instead, it is equally or even more important that
the process transform each participant’s sense of power and agency.
For this reason, the participatory defense movement shuns the
word “client.” That label reduces people into recipients of services,
actions, or change provided or caused by another.
In the
participatory defense model, the key actors responsible for creating
change are the people who face charges, along with their families
and their communities. Therefore, when families first enter a
justice hub meeting, they hear a consistent refrain. While the
system intends to give their loved ones time served—that is, time
incarcerated and away from family and community—they can turn
time served into time saved. Participatory defense empowers
families and communities to bring their loved ones and neighbors
home.
Through the family justice hubs, participatory defense is
therefore a pay-it-forward training for families and communities in
how best to partner with or push the lawyers appointed to defend
their loved ones. Participants learn to dissect, use, and challenge
information in police reports and court transcripts. They learn to
create social biography videos and use other media to obtain fairer
and more productive case outcomes. They learn to engage in
effective public protests that secure new resources for defenders
facing overwhelming caseloads. Most importantly, they learn to
build a sustained community presence in the courtroom to let judges
and prosecutors know the person facing charges is not alone.
B. From Time Served to Time Saved
As incarceration rates balloon to astronomical levels, with one out
of every 100 adult Americans locked up,4 participatory defense may
4 See Badger, E. (2014, April 30). The meteoric, costly and unprecedented rise of
incarceration in America. Washington Post. Retrieved from http://www.washingtonpost.com/bl
ogs/wonkblog/wp/2014/04/30/the-meteoric-costly-and-unprecedented-rise-of-incarceration-inamerica/.
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be the most productive way for affected communities to challenge
mass incarceration and have the movement-building dynamic of
seeing timely and locally relevant results of their efforts.
Participatory defense penetrates the one domain that facilitates
people going to prisons and jails, yet has been left largely
unexplored by the movement to end mass incarceration. That
domain is the courtroom. Participatory defense knows that there
are Tonys across the country waiting to come home and
communities that, if equipped with the necessary knowledge, skills,
and strategies, can intervene in the courtroom domain to bring each
Tony home.
Therefore, participatory defense uses strategies that are
accessible to the people who are most directly affected by criminal
justice systems. Social biography videos are an excellent example.
Sometimes called mitigation videos, these films are a practical
advocacy method that families and communities use to bring their
loved ones home from court. These films vividly tell the life history
of the person facing criminal charges. The videos can be made
quickly and inexpensively. As demonstrated by accolades from
judges and attorneys alike, they have helped to improve outcomes
at every stage of the criminal process, from pretrial release through
plea negotiations and sentencing.
Indeed, social biography videos allow families to avoid a regret
that too often plagues them after sentencing. The common refrain
that De-Bug organizers hear from families at that point is not “I
wish this never happened,” but “I wish they knew him like we know
him.” Social biography videos also address limitations that judges
face when deciding another’s fate. Instead of freezing a person in
the static moment of a charged offense, social biography videos
show the dynamic lives of loved ones who have a past, a future, and
the potential for change, redemption, and transformation like
anyone else.
Thus, in the words of one trial court judge, the videos “humanize
defendants, destroy stereotypes, and leave judges with a far better
understanding of the persons standing before them.”5 Gideon
Project founder and MacArthur “Genius Grant” winner Jon
Rapping6 describes the additional, structural-reform potential
contained in these videos. According to Rapping, the videos
5 Albert Cobarrubias Justice Project. (2014, June 4). Social biography videos. Retrieved
from http://acjusticeproject.org/social-biography-videos/.
6 MacArthur Fellows Program. (2014, September 17). Jonathan Rapping. Retrieved from
http://www.macfound.org/fellows/925/.
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mobilize an “army of advocates with a new tool to fight back against
a system that has become complacent about processing people
because it sees them . . . only as the crime with which they are
accused.”7
The tangible impact of family and community participation on
case outcomes is undeniable. The participatory defense model has
led to acquittals, charges dismissed and reduced, and prison terms
changed to rehabilitation programs. Even life sentences have been
taken off the table. The movement recently celebrated a new
benchmark by tallying the total transformation of “time served to
time saved.” The tally compares the original maximum sentencing
exposure faced by people charged with criminal offenses to the
result after family and community intervention through the
participatory defense model. The tally shows that, in just seven
years, the movement has obtained over 1800 years of time saved.
These numbers indicate that participatory defense can create a
new partnership of community and defender and be a real gamechanger nationally. Eight out of ten of the roughly 2.5 million
people currently incarcerated are eligible to receive public defense
representation.8 Improving public defense is arguably the least
discussed, yet most promising, way to challenge mass incarceration.
To that end, it is important to emphasize that participatory defense
invariably finds ways for families and communities to partner with
public defenders, or to push those lawyers if needed. Therefore, a
third critical strategy of participatory defense pairs community
action to promote system-wide reform through public protest and
other advocacy with subsequent public celebration of shared
successes.
C. Protest and Celebration
Participatory defense holds criminal justice agencies accountable
for their acts and omissions. For example, Gail Noble and her
seventeen-year-old son Karim challenged both a defense lawyer’s
failure to investigate and use available evidence of innocence and a
judge’s racist assumptions that Karim’s summer job was “probably
selling drugs.”9 For Ms. Noble and her son, regardless of the

Albert Cobarrubias Justice Project, supra note 5.
Harlow, C. W. (2000). Defense counsel in criminal cases: Bureau of Justice Statistics
special report. Office of Justice Programs; U.S. Department of Justice, NCJ 179023.
9 Noble, G. (2011, July 16). Standing up to the court. Albert Cobarrubias Justice Project.
Retrieved from http://acjusticeproject.org/keycases/standing-up-to-a-racist-court/; see also
7
8
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ultimate outcome “it was important to get all the issues my son had
on record and for us to feel that we could speak and say something,
instead of just allowing the racist behavior of the courts to continue,
unchecked.”10
The participatory defense movement also has used public protest
to spur systemic change. When the community learned that
misdemeanor defendants were entitled to representation at
arraignment, they met with the local defender leadership about the
failure to provide that representation. When defender leadership
explained that the office lacked resources to provide lawyers at
arraignment, the community engaged in productive policy advocacy
and joined forces with the local civil rights community to increase
pressure for change. As a result, local authorities increased funding
to provide the necessary representation.11
Finally, participatory defense celebrates success. For example,
the Time Saved media project focuses on changing the negative
narrative of the defender-community relationship.
In fact,
defenders often have the best justice success stories that the public
never hears. De-Bug’s Time Saved documentaries tell those stories,
as do the project’s public art works depicting time-served-to-timesaved transformations. Another major celebration was the Time
Saved 1800 party, which gathered defenders and the community to
thank one another for the years and lives saved through
participatory defense.12
D. Participatory Defense as a New Paradigm
Many public defenders understand that the current moment
offers historic opportunities for reform. Many are experiencing a
shift of consciousness regarding the evolution of defense
representation. They know that improving public defense is a
Jayadev, R. (2008, January 16). Tales from a trial. Metroactive. Retrieved from http://www.me
troactive.com/metro/01.16.08/cover-0803.html.
10 See Noble, supra note 9.
11 See Albert Cobarrubias Justice Project. (2012, January 30). Santa Clara County courts:
Now providing legal representation in misdemeanor court to anyone who can’t afford their
own. Retrieved from http://acjusticeproject.org/2012/01/30/santa-clara-county-courts-now-prov
iding-legal-representation-in-misdemeanor-court-to-anyone-who-cant-afford-their-own/.
12 Kaplan, T. (2014, December 18). Bay Area public defenders speak out for justice. San
Jose Mercury News. Retrieved from http://www.mercurynews.com/crime-courts/ci_27163533/b
ay-area-public-defenders-speak-out-justice. For coverage of the celebration, see Albert
Cobarrubias Justice Project. (2014, December 20). Video and media coverage of the Time
Saved party: Celebrating 1862 years saved from incarceration! Retrieved from http://acjustice
project.org/2014/12/20/photos-and-media-of-the-time-saved-party-celebrating-1862-years-save
d-from-incarceration/.
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bigger task than they can tackle on their own. Limiting the
discussion of criminal justice reform to lawyers is like leaving
resolution of the health care crisis solely to doctors. Defenders are
therefore seeking new strategies and new allies. Participatory
defense offers both.
Evidence of this changing defender ethos includes the recent
collaboration of several defender offices into a national Community
Oriented Defenders Network. In this network, over 100 offices are
sharing new approaches that challenge the status quo of indigent
defense. In New York, the Neighborhood Defender Service of
Harlem and the Bronx Defenders are practicing holistic defense,
attacking the contextual issues of poverty that often force people
into criminal justice systems. In the South, Gideon’s Promise is
giving elite training to defenders to face some of the toughest courts
in the country. In California, the Alameda County Public Defender
is now providing representation in immigration court, and the San
Francisco office has launched a system-wide study of how racial
discrimination plays out in the courts.
Such programs are
historically unprecedented approaches to public defense in that
state.
But as forward-thinking as these developments are, they still
focus on the question of what more lawyers can do instead of
empowering those whom the lawyers represent to be change agents
in their own right. Participatory defense can trigger exponentially
greater change—indeed, a cataclysmic shake-up of the criminal
justice system—by adding a huge number of strong new voices to
the criminal justice reform movement.
Partnerships between defenders, on one hand, and people who are
facing charges as well as their loved ones and communities, on the
other, are powerful levers for opening up criminal justice systems
and getting a good hard look under the hood. Community power
can flex that lever to fix broken policies—whether those policies
involve wrongful charging practices, mandatory sentences, or
ensuring that defenders have the resources to do what the
community needs them to do in order to bring their loved ones
home.
All across the country, the infrastructure and organizing IQ
necessary to practice and expand participatory defense already
exists and is waiting to be tapped. Participatory defense can
animate and challenge communities to step deeper into court
processes that many thought were only the province of lawyers. In
fact, the most effective participatory defenders may not necessarily
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be those familiar with the criminal justice system, but the broader
pool of community stakeholders. Thus, family justice hub meetings
in San Jose are not held at a criminal justice reform organization,
but rather at a church and a youth media center.
This broad network reflects the core question that drives the
participatory defense movement: Who do people turn to, confide in,
or call for solace when they learn they are facing a court case? Is it
their family, their temple, the neighborhood association, the
community organization at the corner block, their union? Any
community touchstone can be a family justice hub simply by
advocating for their loved one throughout the lifespan of the
adjudication process.
That same communicative action
simultaneously and dramatically increases the number of people in
the movement to challenge mass incarceration.13
Thus, preexisting community anchors already exist and often are
already aware of their capacities for leveraging collective power to
challenge powerful institutions that are injuring their congregant,
neighbor, friend, or loved one. In marginalized communities, this is
how schools get fixed, police agencies are held to account, and
neighborhoods obtain investments of new resources. Participatory
defense encourages community organizing intelligence and strength
to penetrate and transform local court systems.
As you read this article, there are parents around the country
sitting steadfast on courtroom back benches in solidarity with their
children as they face a hearing. There are church pastors writing
letters to judges to reduce an impending sentence. Such initiatives
show the ubiquitous potential of participatory defense. If these
actions are reimagined as part and parcel of a larger, named
practice rather than isolated responses, then a more profound,
sustained reshaping of the criminal justice system can occur—
fueled by the people and communities most directly affected by
crime and mass incarceration.
Consider the maturation of community-oriented defense. The
first gathering of public defenders under this umbrella ten years
ago had only eight participating offices. Over 100 offices were
represented at the most recent gathering.
Public defenders
practiced community-oriented lawyering before they heard the
term. Giving the practice a name promoted its growth and
development.

13 Cf. Moore, J. (2014). Democracy enhancement in criminal law and procedure. Utah Law
Review, 2014(3), 543–612, at 570–572.
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In the same way, it is important not to freeze participatory
defense as a static invention or program. Instead, participatory
defense simply names an inclination that already exists in
communities across the country as a way to advance its potency and
impact. There is a forward-moving power in naming an impulse.
As discussed in Part III, naming and claiming the justice-seeking
impulse of participatory defense helps to locate the movement as
one of several grassroots efforts that have shaped the historical
development of right to counsel legal doctrine. More specifically,
naming the impulse connects the movement closely with that
doctrine’s deep roots in the due process right to be heard.
III. PARTICIPATORY DEFENSE, CONSTITUTIONAL CRISIS, AND THE
DUE PROCESS RIGHT TO BE HEARD
Participatory defense is a logical response to the most recent
phase of an ongoing public defense crisis.14 People who face charges
but cannot afford to hire lawyers comprise at least eighty percent of
the criminal caseload in the United States.15 The quality of public
defense therefore has high salience in the best of circumstances.
The current context is suboptimal. As indicated in Part II, defender
systems are plagued with excessive workloads and underfunding.
At the same time, the nation confronts the largest income and
wealth gaps since the Gilded Age, increasingly insurmountable
barriers to socioeconomic mobility, and record-breaking
hyperincarceration patterns that disproportionately affect lowincome people and people of color.16
In fact, the constitutional history of the indigent criminal
defendant’s right to counsel reveals that the right was born of a
crisis in which it has remained enmired. The same history also
reveals participatory defense to be the latest of several collective
movements that have shaped the provision of defense services and,
in turn, the content of the governing law. This phenomenon occurs
as the Supreme Court gives a constitutional imprimatur to practices
developed in the trenches by people who support and oppose the
status quo operations of criminal justice systems.

14 See Moore, J. (2013). G forces: Gideon v. Wainwright and Matthew Adler’s move beyond
cost-benefit analysis. Seattle Journal of Social Justice, 11, 1025–1064, at 1026 n.4, 1058–1061
(discussing system failures).
15 See Harlow, supra note 8.
16 See Moore, J. (manuscript on file with author). Discrimination, democracy, and the Sixth
Amendment right to choose.
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Those constitutional imprimaturs have invoked the Due Process
and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment as well
as the Sixth Amendment “assistance of counsel” guarantee. The
tangled doctrinal history traces to 1932, when Powell v. Alabama17
was decided amid an increasingly international scandal over
lynching in the United States.18 Centrally at issue in Powell was
the defendant’s due process right to be heard.19
Powell infamously involved nine young black men accused by two
white women of the then-capital crime of rape.20 The trial judge
appointed the entire local bar to represent these young men, with
the result that no attorney was individually accountable for any of
their cases.21 The Court described the resulting trials and death
sentences as just shy of “judicial murder.”22 The Court was
otherwise circumspect about the highly-charged race, class, and
gender identities at issue,23 and about the battle between the
Communist Party and the NAACP over control of the case.24
The Communists won that battle.25 Party lawyers persuaded the
Court to intervene in a previously sacrosanct sphere of statecontrolled criminal procedure.
Powell held that due process
required appointment of counsel during the “critical period” of
pretrial consultation and fact investigation, at least in capital cases
with defendants who were young, illiterate, and far from home.26

Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932).
Kelley, R. D. G. (1990). Hammer and hoe: Alabama communists during the Great
Depression. Chapel Hill, NC: UNC Press, at 78–79; Carter, D. T. (1979). Scottsboro: A tragedy
of the American South. Baton Rouge, LA: LSU Press, at 142–143.
19 Powell, 287 U.S. at 5758, 71.
20 Ibid. at 64–65, 71. The youngest of the so-called Scottsboro Boys was 13; the eldest was
20. Klarman, M. J. (2006). Powell v. Alabama: The Supreme Court confronts “legal
lynchings.” In C. B. Steiker (Ed.), Criminal procedures stories (pp. 1–44). New York, NY:
Foundation Press/Thornton/West, at 1. The “boys” had names: Ozie Powell, Willie Roberson,
Andy Wright, Olen Montgomery, Haywood Patterson, Charles Weems, Clarence Norris, Roy
Wright, and Eugene Williams. Duru, N. J. (2004). The Central Park five, the Scottsboro boys,
and the myth of the bestial black man. Cardozo Law Review, 25, 1315–1366, at 1320, 1334.
21 Powell, 287 U.S. at 52–57.
22 Ibid. at 72.
23 Klarman, supra note 20.
24 Kelley, supra note 18, at 80–91; Colbert, D. L. (1990).
Challenging the challenge:
Thirteenth Amendment as a prohibition against the racial use of peremptory challenges.
Cornell Law Review, 76, 1–128, at 81 & n.406 (citing Carter, supra note 18; McNeil, G. R.
(1983). Groundwork: Charles Hamilton Houston and the struggle for civil rights.
Philadelphia, PA: University of Pennsylvania Press, at 109–111, 119–121).
25 Kelley, supra note 18, at 78–81 (discussing class-based tension between organizations
and backlash against party for promoting racial equality, opposing lynching, and
representing black defendants accused of rape); see also Colbert, supra note 24 (discussing
tension and collaboration between organizations).
26 Powell, 287 U.S. at 5758, 71.
17
18
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Thus, in the wake of public protest and legal battles over the
injustice of the Scottsboro convictions, the Powell Court turned
inward to emphasize the unique nature of the relationship between
people facing charges and their lawyers, as well as the special role
of the communication that occurs within that relationship.27
Describing that relationship and communication as bearing the
“inviolable character of the confessional,”28 the Court reasoned that
the due process right to counsel is the right to be heard by and
through a dedicated advocate—one who bears the awesome
responsibility of giving voice to another’s interests and concerns.29
Powell held that relationship to be the necessary foundation for
fulfilling counsel’s core duties to communicate, investigate, and
advocate.30 Powell further held that there is no substitute for that
intersubjective work, including judicial oversight at trial.31
The New York Times praised Powell for soothing “the rancor of
extreme radicals while confirming the faith of the American people
in the . . . integrity of the courts.”32 A deeply dissatisfied
Communist Party begged to differ. The party pilloried the Court for
issuing a how-to primer on legal lynching.33 Powell’s holding was
hardly radical.
To the contrary, the Court gave a federal
constitutional imprimatur to the broad national consensus
mandating appointment of counsel in capital cases.34 Michael
Klarman further argues that the “quality of defense representation
for indigent southern blacks did not significantly improve as a
result of Powell” as the decision “len[t] legitimacy to a system that
remained deeply oppressive.”35
Indeed, the Court has repeatedly underscored the “peculiarly
sacred” nature of the federal constitutional right to counsel.36 While
the right comprises an idiosyncratic mandate to distribute resources
to people who need them, it is systematically dishonored in the
breach.37 The 1940 case of Avery v. Alabama is one example among

Ibid. at 57.
Ibid. at 61.
29 Ibid. at 68–69.
30 Ibid. at 57.
31 Ibid. at 68–69.
32 Gerhardt, M. J. (2002). The rhetoric of judicial critique: From judicial restraint to the
virtual Bill of Rights. William & Mary Bill of Rights Journal, 10, 585–645, at 607.
33 Ibid.
34 Moore, supra note 14, at 1053.
35 Klarman, M. J. (2009). Scottsboro. Marquette Law Review, 93, 379–431, at 429–431.
36 Avery v. Alabama, 308 U.S. 444, 447 (1940) (citing Lewis v. United States, 146 U.S. 370,
374375 (1892)).
37 Moore, supra note 14, at 1053.
27
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many. In Avery, the Court celebrated the “peculiarly sacred” due
process right to counsel by affirming a murder conviction and death
sentence.38 The Court did so despite counsel’s protests that the few
hours available between appointment and trial were inadequate to
communicate, investigate, and advocate for a man showing
symptoms of serious mental illness.39
Less than twenty years later, Alabama was in the headlines again
as mass arrests during protests against racial and economic
segregation coincided with the height of the Cold War. As was the
case in the 1930s, highly politicized international attention—this
time including critical coverage by Soviet and Chinese Communists
seeking allies among postcolonial nations—focused on hypocrisies
and failures of capitalism and liberal democracy.40
It was in this heated context, just weeks before Martin Luther
King Jr. issued his Letter from Birmingham City Jail41 and
television cameras captured Bull Connor’s deputies attacking black
children with dogs and fire hoses, that the Supreme Court issued
two blockbuster opinions expanding the federal constitutional right
to appointed counsel. Douglas v. California invoked both due
process and equal protection to mandate appointment of appellate
counsel in jurisdictions providing a right of direct appeal in criminal
cases.42 Gideon v. Wainwright also relied on due process—but only
as a mechanism for incorporating the Sixth Amendment mandate
for appointed counsel in the federal setting into state cases
involving felony charges.43
The right to appointed counsel gradually expanded to cover
juveniles44 as well as adult misdemeanor charges,45 probation cases
with potential for incarceration,46 pretrial settings47 including plea
bargaining,48 sentencing,49 first-tier petitions for discretionary

Avery, 308 U.S. at 445, 447, 453.
Ibid. at 447–453.
40 See, e.g., Dudziak, M. L. (2002). Cold War civil rights: Race and the image of American
democracy. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, at 3–6, 11–14.
41 King, M. L., Jr. (1995). Letter from Birmingham City Jail. In S. Lynd & A. Lynd (Eds.),
Nonviolence in America: A documentary history (pp. 254–268). Maryknoll, NY: Orbis, at 254.
42 Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353, 356358 (1963).
43 Douglas, 372 U.S. at 339.
44 In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 41 (1967).
45 Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 37 (1972).
46 Alabama v. Shelton, 535 U.S. 654, 658, 674 (2002).
47 Rothgery v. Gillespie Cnty., 554 U.S. 191, 194 (2008).
48 See, e.g., Lafler v. Cooper, 132 S. Ct. 1376, 13901391 (2012); Missouri v. Frye, 132 S.
Ct. 1399, 14101411 (2012).
49 See, e.g., Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 390399 (2000).
38
39
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appellate review,50 state postconviction proceedings,51 and advice on
the collateral consequence of deportation that attaches to any
potential plea agreement.52
Yet as the scope of the right expands, its enforceability with
respect to the quality of representation remains weak. Thirty years
ago, Strickland v. Washington established an onerous two-part test
for people who challenge the quality of defense lawyering. They
must prove both that their attorneys engaged in unreasonable acts
or omissions according to prevailing professional standards, and a
reasonable probability that those failures altered the outcome of
Under Strickland and accompanying cases,54
their cases.53
constitutional standards are so low that lawyers hurdle them while
asleep,55 habitually drunk,56 and (while awake and apparently
sober) failing to investigate and present readily available evidence
of actual innocence in capital murder cases.57
This brief doctrinal history reveals that, every thirty years or so,
as this country’s distinctively intransigent intersection of race,
crime, and poverty58 sparks another round of politicized and
international uproar,59 the right to counsel lurches in a new
direction. The most recent cycle has seen heightened attention to
the record-breaking hyperincarceration of low income and minority
people in the United States.60 That cycle has coincided with
Halbert v. Michigan, 545 U.S. 605, 610611 (2005).
See Martinez v. Ryan, 132 S. Ct. 1309, 1320–1321 (2012) (ineffective assistance on firsttier collateral review may defeat procedural default defense to federal habeas claim); see also
Maples v. Thomas, 132 S. Ct. 912, 927 (2012) (applying Martinez where postconviction
counsel abandoned client without notice).
52 See Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 1473, 1478 (2010).
53 Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 664, 688 (1984).
54 See, e.g., Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 348–350 (1980) (establishing test for conflict
of interest).
55 See Muniz v. Smith, 647 F.3d 619, 623625 (6th Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 1575
(2012) (discussing “sleeping lawyer” cases).
56 Frye v. Lee, 235 F.3d 897, 907 (4th Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 533 U.S. 960 (2001)
(affirming death sentence while “troubled” by capital defense lawyer’s “decades-long habit” of
drinking “twelve ounces of rum” nightly during trial); see also Tabak, R. R. (2003). Why an
independent appointing authority is necessary to choose counsel for indigent people in capital
punishment cases. Hofstra Law Review, 31, 1105–1115, at 11121113.
57 See Scanlon v. Harkleroad, 740 F. Supp. 2d 706, 728730 (M.D.N.C. 2010), aff’d per
curiam, 467 Fed. App’x 164 (4th Cir. 2012), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 164 (2012) (denying
defendant new trial despite ineffective assistance in guilt/innocence phase). The author
represented Petitioner Donald Scanlon in state and federal appellate and postconviction
challenges to his convictions and death sentence. Ibid. at 708.
58 See Moore, supra note 13, at 551–563.
59 See Dudziak, supra note 40.
60 Wacquant, L. (2010). Class, race and hyperincarceration in revanchist America.
Daedelus, 139(3), 74–90, at 78–79; see also Lacey, N. (2008). The prisoner’s dilemma: Political
economy and punishment in contemporary democracies. Cambridge: Cambridge University
50
51

MOORE ET AL.

1296

6/11/2015 11:29 PM

Albany Law Review

[Vol. 78.3

expansions of the right to appointed counsel in pretrial and posttrial
settings.61
As a result—and in keeping with the prescient
recommendations of certain Antifederalists62—the right to counsel
has largely been socialized, with the vast majority of criminal
defendants facing felony charges receiving government-funded
defense services.63
Of course, economic need seldom qualifies people for special
constitutional consideration. To the contrary, as Julie Nice argues,
poverty law has been effectively deconstitutionalized in the United
States.64 Nor are indigent criminal defendants typically viewed as
among the “deserving poor.”65 To the contrary, “[l]egislators have
declined to protect criminal defendants, except in rare and narrowly
circumscribed circumstances when powerful constituencies (the
press, lawyers) have been threatened.”66
In light of that
observation, a cynic might explain the idiosyncratic constitutional
mandate to provide government-funded criminal defense attorneys
as a redistribution of assets to one set of lawyers (defenders) that
makes life easier for other lawyers (prosecutors and judges) through
a pro forma greasing of the carceral state’s machinery.
That explanation appears less cynical given the contemporary
degradation of the “peculiarly sacred” right to counsel and the
underlying fundamental due process right to be heard into a grim
complex of plea mills67 and debtor’s prisons.68 For attorneys who
Press, at xv, 156–169 (citing “general and depressing” agreement on inevitable export of U.S.
“penal populism,” but disputing that thesis).
61 See supra notes 48–49, 51–53 and accompanying text.
62 Warren, C. (1911). A history of the American bar. Boston, MA: Little Brown, at 219, 221–
223 (quoting Antifederalists who urged that the legal profession be “annihilated” or
completely socialized through the creation of “a State Advocate-General, to appear for all
persons indicted”).
63 See Harlow, supra note 8.
64 Nice, J. A. (2008). No scrutiny whatsoever: Deconstitutionalization of poverty law, dual
rules of law, & dialogic default. Fordham Urban Law Journal, 35, 629–671, at 629–636; see
also Barnes, M. L., & Chemerinsky, E. (2009). The disparate treatment of race and class in
constitutional jurisprudence. Law and Contemporary Problems, 72, 109–130, at 122–126
(probing causes of varying judicial scrutiny afforded to class-based and race-based claims for
redress).
65 See, e.g., Dripps, D. A. (1993). Criminal procedure, footnote four, and the theory of public
choice; Or, why don’t legislatures give a damn about the rights of the accused? Syracuse Law
Review, 44, 1079–1102, at 1089–92; see also Moore, supra note 14, at 1028 & n.13 (discussing
empirical research indicating that a significant minority of jurors believe defendants “must
have done something” to warrant criminal charges).
66 Lerner, C. S. (2004). Legislators as the “American criminal class”: Why Congress
(sometimes) protects the rights of defendants. University of Illinois Law Review, 2004, 599–
672, at 604–613. But see Wright, R. F. (2004). Parity of resources for defense counsel and the
reach of public choice theory. Iowa Law Review, 90, 219–268, at 263–268.
67 See, e.g., Wilbur v. City of Mt. Vernon, 989 F. Supp. 2d 1122 (W.D. Wash. 2013).
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strive to provide not merely constitutionally effective but high
quality defense services, onerous workloads and fee caps create
agonizing choices. In 2006, for example, misdemeanor counsel in
Knox County, Tennessee, averaged nearly 1700 cases each, and had
less than an hour to spend on any given case.69 Two points of
contrast throw these statistics into sharp relief.
First, the
Tennessee lawyers were assigned nearly eight times the number of
misdemeanor cases allowed under weighted workload standards in
other states, such as Massachusetts.70 Second, recent major
weighted caseload studies indicate that the average misdemeanor
case should take approximately twelve hours of competent, diligent
attorney effort to reach a satisfactory level of representation.71
Unfortunately, workload standards remain rare. Enforceable
standards are even rarer.72 This is so despite the American Bar
Association’s 2006 Ethics Opinion requiring indigent defense
attorneys to reject cases for which they cannot provide competent,
diligent representation—with “competence” and “diligence”
comprising the core duties to communicate, investigate, and
advocate.73 The costs of overloaded, underresourced indigent
defense are significant. To cite one example, a Florida attorney was
juggling fifty felony cases at a time, or nearly half the felony
caseload that a Massachusetts lawyer may accept in an entire year.

68 See, e.g., Fant v. City of Ferguson, 4:15-cv-253 (E.D. Mo. Feb. 2, 2015) (class action
complaint); Shapiro, J. (2014, August 25). In Ferguson, court fines and fees fuel anger. NPR.
Retrieved from http://www.npr.org/2014/08/25/343143937/in-ferguson-court-fines-and-fees-fue
l-anger.
69 National Right to Counsel Committee. (2009). Justice denied: America’s continuing
neglect of our constitutional right to counsel. Washington, DC: The Constitution Project and
the National Legal Aid & Defender Association, at 68. Retrieved from http://www.constitution
project.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/10/139.pdf.
70 Committee for Public Counsel Services. (2011). Policies and Procedures Governing
Billing and Compensation, Rule 16. Retrieved from http://www.publiccounsel.net/private_cou
nsel_manual/CURRENT_MANUAL_2010/MANUALChap5links3.pdf.
71 RubinBrown LLP for the ABA’s Standing Committee on Legal Aid and Indigent
Defendants. (2014). The Missouri Project: A study of the Missouri defender system and
attorney workload standards. Chicago, IL: American Bar Association. Retrieved from http://w
ww.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/events/legal_aid_indigent_defendants/2014/ls_sclaid_5c
_the_missouri_project_report.authcheckdam.pdf; Carmichael, D., Clemens, A., Caspers, H.,
Marchbanks, M. P., & Wood, S. (2015). Guidelines for indigent defense caseloads: A report to
the Texas Indigent Defense Commission. College Station, TX: Public Policy Research Institute,
at 50 & Figure 8-1.
72 Lefstein, N. (2011). Securing reasonable caseloads: Ethics and law in public defense.
Chicago, IL: American Bar Association, at 42–48.
73 ABA Committee on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Formal Opinion 06-441.
(2006, May 13). Retrieved from http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/l
egal_aid_indigent_defendants/ls_sclaid_def_ethics_opinion_defender_caseloads_06_441.authc
heckdam.pdf.
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As a result, she failed to communicate a plea offer to a client. The
prosecutor withdrew the offer, and the client’s sentence was
quintupled.74
Such system failures underscore the timeliness and importance of
the participatory defense movement. This Part has sought to locate
that movement within a crisis-ridden doctrinal history and, in
particular, as closely linked to the fundamental due process right to
be heard. Within that context, participatory defense holds promise
as a form of grassroots lawmaking. Throughout the history of the
right to counsel, public pressure has sparked legal change, often as
the Supreme Court grants a constitutional imprimatur to practices
and standards developed in the trenches of criminal justice systems.
Reform advocates should therefore welcome participatory defense
as a new and powerful force for improving attorney performance
standards.
Raised performance standards should gradually
improve Strickland and other legal rules that incorporate those
practices into the substantive law. In addition, improved defense
performances can rebalance power disparities badly skewed by
historically unprecedented concentrations of prosecutorial
authority.75 That rebalancing in turn can strengthen rapidly
diminishing rights, such as the right to jury trial and the due
process right to be heard.76
In support of those goals, Parts IV through VI offer additional
analysis of the participatory defense movement. Part IV offers a
theoretical foundation, placing participatory defense within an
innovative democracy-enhancing approach to criminal law and
procedure. Part V reveals ways that participatory defense can
strengthen reform litigation and policy advocacy by pairing the due
process right to be heard with corresponding duties to communicate,
investigate, and advocate.
Part VI offers practical tools for
amplifying the voices of people facing charges, their families, and
their communities in the struggle for criminal justice reform.
IV. PARTICIPATORY DEFENSE AND DEMOCRACY ENHANCEMENT
The foregoing doctrinal discussion underscores the “peculiarly
sacred” nature of the federal constitutional right to counsel as one
that is systematically dishonored in the breach. Based on that
history, the participatory defense movement and the due process
74
75
76

National Right to Counsel Committee, supra note 69, at 69.
See Moore, supra note 13, at 555 & n.70 (citing authorities).
See supra notes 67–75 and accompanying text.
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roots of right to counsel doctrine may appear a barren source of
amusement for reform advocates. This Part seeks to strengthen the
case for participatory defense and the due process right to be heard
by framing both within a democracy-enhancing theory of criminal
justice.77
That theory moves beyond dominant utilitarian-retributive
justifications for criminal law, as well as the dominant fairness-law
enforcement justifications for criminal procedure. The theory does
so in two interrelated ways. First, the theory emphasizes equality
in the generation and administration of the governing law. Second,
by promoting greater equality in effective personal and communal
self-governance, the theory aims at reciprocal reductions in the
scope and impact of the carceral state.78
The theory’s commitments to equality and effective selfgovernance resonate with the core commitments of the participatory
defense model and with the values embodied in the fundamental
due process right to be heard. Those core commitments and values
can in turn transform the currently minimal content of the
constitutionally protected relationship between a lawyer and a
person facing criminal charges. Reimagining that relationship in
light of these core commitments and values opens a distinctive
space for the vindication of human dignity. This is so in part
because the relationship can and should serve as a bulwark against
the concentrated power of the prosecuting governmental authority
and the collective will that authority claims to represent.
Yet as indicated in Part III, within a democracy-enhancing theory
of criminal justice the participatory defense model promises even
more. The relationship between a person facing charges and his or
her attorney is an important site for communicative action. Within
that relationship, participants can acknowledge and critique the
law while shaping its application. As indicated in Part II’s
discussion of the participatory defense movement, that
communicative action may be cooperative or disruptive.79 In either
case, it can and should be seen as a form of grassroots lawmaking.80
Of course the immediate focus of this law formation and
application will be the individual case at hand. Nevertheless, as a
distinctive form of communicative action, relationships between
lawyers and people facing criminal charges can yield broader and
77
78
79
80

See Moore, supra note 13, at 546 n.13, 563–573.
Ibid. at 563–565.
See ibid. at 543–612.
Cf. Moore, supra note 16.
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longer-term improvements in the accountability, transparency, and
fairness of the law and its administration.81 In the context of right
to counsel doctrine, participatory defense provides the pressure
necessary to push relationships between people facing criminal
charges and their lawyers—and through those relationships, to
push the constitutional content of the right to counsel—toward
fuller vindication of the core rights and duties to communicate,
investigate, and advocate.
Through this productive tension, participatory defense presses to
improve standards of attorney performance. As those improved
standards gain sufficient traction, they will redefine the substantive
meaning of effective representation under Strickland as well as the
content of Powell’s distinctive due process right to be heard. Thus,
framing participatory defense within a democracy-enhancing theory
of criminal justice takes the unique communicative action that is
nascent in the right to counsel to a more powerful level. Viewed in
that framework, the relationship connotes expressive activity that is
as much a mode of democratic self-governance as participating in a
debate at a town hall meeting, casting a ballot in a voter’s booth, or
deliberating over the application of law to evidence in a jury room.
To be sure, the grim history of the constitutional right to counsel
dims any utopian visions. It also is true that the Supreme Court
has openly denigrated the importance of the attorney-client
relationship.82 Nevertheless, reframed by a democracy-enhancing
theory of criminal law and procedure that supplements Sixth
Amendment doctrine with due process and equal protection
principles, participatory defense is a new and powerful way to
reshape the right to counsel as a unique form of politically effective
intersubjectivity. This innovative model for criminal justice reform
can strengthen partnerships between defense lawyers and people
who face charges, their families, and their communities. Part V
encourages reform advocates to apply these principles in future
litigation and policy advocacy that aims to improve public defense
systems while reducing the footprint of the carceral state.

81 See, e.g., Moore, J. (2012). Democracy and criminal discovery reform after Connick and
Garcetti. Brooklyn Law Review, 77, 1329–1388, at 1332–1333, 1371–1387 (discussing
litigation and policy history of full open file discovery reform).
82 See Moore, supra note 16 (discussing Montejo v. Louisiana, 556 U.S. 778, 784 (2009),
and Morris v. Slappy, 461 U.S. 1, 14 (1983)).
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V. PARTICIPATORY DEFENSE AND FOURTH-GENERATION PUBLIC
DEFENSE REFORM
Parts II through IV introduced the core concepts and strategies of
the participatory defense movement and analyzed that reform
model within innovative doctrinal and theoretical frameworks. This
Part discusses a recent wave of public defense reform projects and
describes how reform advocates can strengthen future efforts by
combining participatory defense with a renewed focus on the due
process right to be heard. Part V.A surveys scholarly proposals for
public defense reform. Part V.B identifies arguments that gained
traction in the Missouri and Florida Supreme Courts. Part V.C
discusses the relative inattention that courts and commentators
have afforded to due process and to voices of the key stakeholders in
the public defense reform movement: people facing charges, their
families, and their communities.
A. Scholarly Reform Proposals
Scholars have offered many constitutional solutions for the
indigent defense crisis beyond the Sixth Amendment’s
demonstrably ineffective ineffectiveness test.
Some invoke
separation of powers doctrine, that is, a court’s inherent authority
and responsibility as an independent third branch of government to
regulate judicial proceedings.83 Others advocate equal protection
claims grounded in the fundamental right of access to the courts.84
Cara Drinan proposes federal legislative solutions,85 while Ronald
Wright describes how arguments for resource parity between
prosecution and defense can yield reform.86 Janet Moore, a
coauthor of this article, points to additional strategies of vindicating
the indigent defendant’s right to choose an attorney87 and adopting
full open file discovery policies.88
Addressing the workload issue more specifically, scholars
83 Darwall, J., & Guggenheim, M. (2012). Funding the people’s right. New York University
Journal of Legislation and Public Policy, 15, 619–665, at 633–648; Logan, W. A. (2010).
Litigating the ghost of Gideon in Florida: Separation of powers as a tool to achieve indigent
defense reform. Missouri Law Review, 75, 885–906, at 903–906.
84 See Lucas, L. S. (2013). Reclaiming equality to reframe indigent defense reform.
Minnesota Law Review, 97, 1197–1267.
85 Drinan, C. H. (2010). The National Right to Counsel Act: A congressional solution to the
nation’s indigent defense crisis. Harvard Journal of Legislation, 47, 487–522.
86 Wright supra note 66, at 221, 253–262.
87 Moore, supra note 16.
88 Ibid.
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highlight debiasing strategies to address counsel’s cognitive
blinders to their workload-created ethical dilemmas,89 and suggest
that Cuyler v. Sullivan offers a more forgiving conflict-of-interest
standard through which to obtain reform.90 Still others, despairing
of the resources necessary to improve overloaded and underfunded
systems, recommend overt triage by formally restricting the scope of
the right to counsel91 or by focusing resources on death penalty
cases or colorable innocence claims.92 Counterarguments favor
reverse triage, which stems the tide of low-level cases that swamp
criminal justice systems93 at an astonishing cost.94
In what Professor Drinan presciently termed the “third
generation of indigent defense litigation,”95 some of the foregoing
arguments are gaining traction in state courts. Recent decisions of
the Missouri and Florida supreme courts are exemplary. Studying
these cases reveals, however, that due process and the opportunity
to be heard play as minor a role in the judicial analyses as they do
in recent scholarship. Courts and commentators are similarly
reticent regarding the experiences and perspectives of the key
stakeholders: people facing criminal charges, their families, and
their communities. In keeping with the analysis in Parts II through

89 Eldred, T. W. (2013). Prescriptions for ethical blindness: Improving advocacy for
indigent defendants in criminal cases. Rutgers Law Review, 65, 333–394; see also Freedman,
M. H. (2005). An ethical manifesto for public defenders. Valparaiso Law Review, 39, 911–923
(arguing against triage and urging defenders to withdraw and inform clients and courts when
overload threatens competent and diligent performance); Robbennolt, J. K., & Sternlight, J.
R. (2013). Behavioral legal ethics. Arizona State Law Journal, 45, 1107–1183 (noting
cognitive blind spots that prevent attorneys from recognizing and acting on ethical problems).
90 Anderson, H. R. (2012). Funding Gideon’s promise by viewing excessive caseloads as
unethical conflicts of interest. Hastings Constitutional Law Quarterly, 39, 421–456.
91 Dripps, D. A. (2012). Up from Gideon. Texas Tech Law Review, 45, 113–137, at 124–130
(proposing reductions in scope of right and in credentialing of indigent defense service
providers).
92 See Mosteller, R. P. (2010). Protecting the innocent: Part of the solution for inadequate
funding for defenders, not a panacea for targeting justice. Missouri Law Review, 75, 931–988,
at 959973 (critiquing proposals for triage or reassignment in, e.g., Brown, D. K. (2005). The
decline of defense counsel and the rise of accuracy in criminal adjudication. California Law
Review, 93, 1585–1646); see also Barton, B. H., & Bibas, S. (2012). Triaging appointed-counsel
funding and pro se access to justice. University of Pennsylvania Law Review, 160, 967–994, at
990–995 (arguing for triage in counsel appointments).
93 See generally Boruchowitz, R., Brink, M., & Dimino, M. (2009). Minor crimes, massive
waste: The terrible toll of America’s broken misdemeanor courts. Washington, DC: National
Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers. Retrieved from www.nacdl.org/WorkArea/Downloa
dAsset.aspx?id=20808.
94 Braun, E. (2010). $42,000 for a courthouse hour: The cost of processing adult criminal
cases in Hamilton County, Ohio. Cincinnati, OH: Ohio Justice and Policy Center, at 6.
Retrieved from http://www.ohiojpc.org/text/publications/court%20cost.pdf.
95 Drinan, C. H. (2009). The third generation of indigent defense litigation. New York
University Review of Law and Social Change, 33, 427–478, at 462.
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IV of this article, this Part argues that reform advocates should
strengthen their efforts by partnering with the participatory
defense movement and renewing their focus on the indigent
defendant’s due process right to be heard.
B. Prospective Relief and Triage in Missouri and Florida
Missouri is one of the few jurisdictions in which attorneys may
withdraw from or refuse cases due to overwhelming workloads.96 In
contrast, Florida expressly forbids lawyers from withdrawing from
or declining cases due to case overload.97 Yet in each of these
jurisdictions, public defenders persuaded their state supreme court
to vindicate counsel’s duties to decline or withdraw from additional
cases when workloads outstrip resources.98
These cases are remarkable in several respects. First, over sharp
dissents, each court broke Strickland v. Washington’s case-by-case,
ex post stranglehold on right to counsel analysis to order classbased, prospective relief. Second, each court blended rules of ethics
into this prospective Sixth Amendment analysis. Third, defenders
and their allies made these rulings possible by building rich factual
records that documented the degradation of the indigent defense
lawyer into a mere mouthpiece for prosecutors’ charging and plea
decisions.99
Finally, in terms of remedy, each court required system
stakeholders—including prosecutors and trial judges as well as
defenders—to collaborate on reducing defender workloads. Those
requirements raise significant separation of powers issues. They
also intensify the burden of excessive caseloads on indigent
defendants charged with lower-level offenses.
The decisions

96 Missouri Public Defender Commission v. Waters, 370 S.W.3d 592, 599–601 (Mo. 2012)
(discussing Mo. Code Regs. Ann. tit. 18, § 10-4.010 (2010)); Lefstein, supra note 72, at 42
(citing Langton, L., & Farole, D. J., Jr. Public defender offices, 2007—Statistical tables.
Washington, DC: Bureau of Justice Statistics, U.S. Dept. of Justice, at tbl. 7a) (discussing
comparable provisions in eight additional states)).
97 Logan, supra note 83, at 886–887 (citing Fla. Stat. § 775.24(1) (2010); Colo. Rev. Stat. §
21-2-103(1.5)(b)–(c) (2009)).
98 Public Defender v. Florida, 115 So. 3d 261 (Fla. 2013); Waters, 370 S.W.3d at 592; cf.
Wilbur v. City of Mt. Vernon, 989 F. Supp. 2d 1122 (W.D. Wash. 2013) (holding county
systems unconstitutional); see also Simmons v. State Public Defender, 791 N.W.2d 69, 89
(Iowa 2010) (rejecting hard fee cap as unenforceable due to “chilling effect on the
constitutional rights of criminal defendants”).
99 Public Defender, 115 So. 3d at 273–274 & nn. 6–8 (noting that the twenty-six-volume
record showed a “systemic inability of the public defender attorneys” to “interview clients,
conduct investigations, take depositions, prepare mitigation, or counsel clients about pleas
offered at arraignments”).

MOORE ET AL.

1304

6/11/2015 11:29 PM

Albany Law Review

[Vol. 78.3

expressly contemplate diluting speedy trial rights for such
defendants. They also threaten to create additional effective
assistance issues by promoting inexperienced volunteer counsel as a
“stellar example of creative problem-solving.”100
1. Missouri: A System Under Water
Missouri Public Defender Commission v. Waters arose after a
public defender’s office was certified pursuant to an administrative
rule to be unavailable for additional appointments due to excessive
caseloads. A trial judge nevertheless concluded that he “had no
choice” other than to assign Jared Blacksher’s case to a public
defender from that overloaded office.101 The public defender sought
a writ of prohibition. The state supreme court reversed the trial
court’s appointment order by the narrowest possible four-to-three
margin.102
The majority and dissenting opinions clashed on two key points.
The first was whether the case was moot because Blacksher pled
guilty while the petition for the writ was pending. The second and
related issue was whether the Sixth Amendment and cognate state
constitutional law allowed class-based, prospective relief or instead
required petitioners to prove that Blacksher was prejudiced by his
lawyer’s unreasonable performance.
The majority applied the public interest exception to mootness
doctrine. The court concluded that the issue was capable of
repetition but evaded review, and noted that the threat of contempt
hung over counsel forced to choose between complying with an
appointment order, on one hand, or with the administrative rule,
“their ethical obligations and the Sixth Amendment” on the other
hand.103 The majority further concluded that since the petition did
not seek to vacate a conviction, Strickland’s case-by-case, ex post
performance-and-prejudice test did not apply.104
The majority read U.S. Supreme Court Sixth Amendment cases
as holding that, because the right to effective counsel applies at all
critical stages of a case, it is “a prospective right to have counsel’s
advice . . . and not merely a retrospective right to have a verdict or
plea set aside if one can prove that the absence of competent counsel

100
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Waters, 370 S.W.3d at 611.
Ibid. at 597.
Ibid. at 612.
Ibid. at 604–605.
Ibid. at 606–607.
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affected the proceeding.”105 Curiously, the majority cited Missouri
v. Frye, which applied Strickland’s retrospective test to plea
bargaining, and Iowa v. Tovar, which had little to do with effective
assistance or excessive caseloads.106
After concluding that the Sixth Amendment required prospective
analysis of attorney effectiveness, the Waters majority noted that
ethical rules proscribe the conflicts of interest that “inevitably”
result from excessive caseloads.107 Notably, the majority did not cite
Cuyler v. Sullivan’s onerous conflict-and-prejudice Sixth
Amendment test. With respect to remedy, the majority invoked the
courts’ inherent “authority and . . . responsibility to manage their
dockets in a way that . . . respects the constitutional, statutory, and
ethical rights and obligations of the defendant, the prosecutor, the
public defender, and the public.”108
The majority stated that courts could use this inherent authority
to “triage” cases involving the most serious charges or defendants
unable to make bail.109 The majority acknowledged the speedy trial
implications of resulting delays for the presumably less culpable
and dangerous indigent defendants who are charged with lower
level offenses or are able to obtain pretrial release. The court
anticipated “modify[ing] time standards” in such cases to
accommodate “delays necessitated by the insufficient public
defender resources.”110
The majority also advised trial courts to “hold meetings” with
prosecutors and defenders on the record, with evidentiary hearings
as needed, to resolve excessive caseload problems. The majority
recommended this strategy despite the findings of a special master,
whom the court appointed during the pendency of the Waters
petition, that such discussions, although already mandated by the

Ibid. at 607.
Ibid. at 606–607 (citing Missouri v. Frye, 132 S. Ct. 1399 (2012); Iowa v. Tovar, 541
U.S. 77 (2004)). But see Frye, 132 S. Ct. at 1408–1411 (applying Strickland standard); Tovar,
541 U.S. at 91–93 (addressing voluntary waiver issue).
107 Waters, 370 S.W.3d at 607 (citing In re Edward S., 92 Cal. Rptr. 3d 725, 746–747 (Ct.
App. 2009)); Waters, 370 S.W.3d at 610 (holding that “the Sixth Amendment and this Court’s
ethics rules require that a court consider counsel’s competency” before appointment).
108 Waters, 370 S.W.3d at 610–611.
109 Ibid. at 611.
110 Ibid. at 611–612.
For a telling example of indigent-defense jujitsu, see People v.
Roberts, 321 P.3d 581 (Colo. App. 2013) (citing Waters to deny an indigent defendant’s speedy
trial claim). Although Colorado bars counsel from withdrawing from or refusing cases due to
excessive caseloads, see Colo. Rev. Stat. § 21-2-103(1.5)(b)–(c) (2009), the Roberts court
reasoned that the trial court could have granted such a motion and therefore the defendant
could not prove up his speedy trial claim.
105
106
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administrative rules, were utterly fruitless.111
2. Getting Lucky in Florida
In Public Defender v. Florida, the state supreme court confronted
a statute that expressly forbids trial judges from granting motions
to withdraw by public defenders who claim that excessive caseloads
create conflicts of interest. A five-to-two majority held the statute
unconstitutional as applied.112 The ruling was issued nearly a year
after Waters, and shares threads of similar reasoning and remedies.
But the Sunshine State court did not cite the work of its Show Me
State sister court. Instead, the Florida court provided an arguably
more compelling doctrinal analysis to support its ruling.
The reasoning of the cases was similar in several respects. Both
courts cited ethical rules to support their decisions, as well as
courts’ inherent supervisory authority to intervene in the respective
crises. The Florida court expressly cited separation of powers
doctrine as well, no doubt due to that court’s longstanding battle
with the state legislature over indigent defense issues.113 In terms
of remedy, where Waters required stakeholder consultation to triage
cases, the Florida trial court allowed defenders categorically to
refuse appointments in low-level felony cases. Affirming the judge’s
authority to issue such an order, the state supreme court
nevertheless remanded for the judge to reevaluate the situation and
ensure that “the same conditions” still warranted that relief.114
The Missouri and Florida cases also are different in two
significant doctrinal ways. The Florida Supreme Court relied
heavily on Luckey v. Harris, a 1988 Eleventh Circuit decision, to
transform Strickland’s case-by-case, ex post performance-andprejudice ineffectiveness test into a class-based, prospective avenue
toward relief.115 The Florida court also provided a more persuasive
explanation for invoking Missouri v. Frye and related cases to work
around Strickland.
In Luckey, a three-judge panel held that a Georgia defendant
articulated an actionable civil rights claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
The defendant sought injunctive relief against an overloaded,
underfunded state indigent defense system. The panel concluded

111
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Waters, 370 S.W.3d at 610–611.
Public Defender v. Florida, 115 So. 3d 261 (Fla. 2013).
Ibid. at 271–272.
Ibid. at 264, 280.
Ibid. at 276–277 (citing Luckey v. Harris, 860 F.2d 1012, 1017 (11th Cir. 1988)).
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that Luckey could proceed on his claim that this broken system
created “the likelihood of substantial and immediate irreparable
injury” in light of “the inadequacy of remedies at law.”116
Four years later, the case was dismissed on federal abstention
grounds.117
Nevertheless, the Florida Supreme Court found
compelling the original panel’s conclusion that Strickland’s case-bycase, ex post performance-and-prejudice test was “inappropriate” for
evaluating comparable claims of system-wide failure.118 Equally
compelling for the Florida court was the federal panel’s reasoning
(expressed sotto voce in Waters) that the finality and other concerns
animating Strickland’s rigorous test are not present in claims for
prospective relief.119 “The sixth amendment,” the Florida court
approvingly quoted, “protects rights that do not affect the outcome
of a trial.”120
By distinguishing the harm alleged from the relief sought, the
Florida court framed Missouri v. Frye and other recent Supreme
Court cases as modifying Strickland’s prejudice test to fit more
precisely when effective assistance claims arise from pretrial
processes such as plea bargaining.
In keeping with that
interpretation, the Florida court drew its ex ante prejudice standard
for excessive caseload motions from the text of the ethical rule
governing conflicts of interest. To prevail on the motion, claimants
must show a “substantial risk that the representation of [one] or
more clients will be materially limited by the lawyer’s
responsibilities to another client.” The court found “substantial
evidence to support the trial courts’ findings and conclusions of law
to that effect.”121
C. The Sound of Silence
Waters and Public Defender v. Florida are important ripples in
the current wave in indigent defense reform. But these cases also
raise difficult questions. At a practical level, these decisions
Harris, 860 F.2d at 1017.
Luckey v. Miller, 976 F.2d 673 (11th Cir. 1992). The case’s tortuous history is discussed
in, e.g., Citron, R. (1991). (Un)Luckey v. Miller: The case for a structural injunction to
improve indigent defense services. Yale Law Journal, 101, 481–504, at 493–494.
118 Public Defender, 115 So. 3d at 276–277.
119 Ibid. at 276.
120 Ibid. (quoting Harris, 860 F.2d at 1017).
121 Public Defender, 115 So. 3d at 279 (citing Lafler v. Cooper, 132 S. Ct. 1376 (2012);
Missouri v. Frye, 132 S. Ct. 1399 (2012); R. Regulating Fla. Bar 4-1.7(a)(2)); see also Simmons
v. State Public Defender, 791 N.W.2d 69, 86–89 (Iowa 2010) (citing Luckey to impose ex ante
effectiveness test and allow appointed counsel to challenge fee caps).
116
117
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expressly or implicitly require prosecutors, defenders, and trial
judges to cooperate in winnowing the defense workload down to a
manageable burden. How are these stakeholders to negotiate
separation of powers doctrine and other concerns that affect
charging, plea, diversion, and sentencing decisions? How will
speedy trial rights be protected? To what extent will overextended
appointed counsel be called upon to fill the breach?122 And perhaps
most significantly, how will the voices of the key stakeholders—the
people facing criminal charges, their families, and their
communities—inform the process?
At a theoretical level, while the Florida Supreme Court’s Sixth
Amendment analysis bears more scrutiny than the reasoning in
Waters, there is reason to be circumspect about the long-term
prospects of a robust class-based, prospective Strickland standard.
As discussed in Part III, on right to counsel issues the U.S. Supreme
Court has acted consistently with its overall approach to
constitutional criminal procedure rights; the Court gives with one
hand only to take with the other. The Court establishes a right,
then promptly ensures its weak enforceability—often with highflown language and self-congratulations. Gideon v. Wainwright123
and Strickland124 form an illustrative pair in the right to counsel
context. Brady v. Maryland125 and United States v. Bagley126
illustrate the same pattern with respect to prosecutorial discovery
duties. Likewise, Batson v. Kentucky127 and Purkett v. Elem128
respectively proclaimed, then weakened, the equal protection rights
of prospective jurors to be free from invidious discrimination.
Given the Court’s constitutional give-and-take, the fourth
generation of indigent defense reform litigation may find due
process to be a critical complement to the Sixth Amendment in
securing more robust assessment of, and prospective relief for,
excessive workload claims. This may be especially true with respect
to the due process duties to communicate and investigate, which are
prerequisites for satisfying the duty to advocate. Yet due process is
barely mentioned by the courts and commentators discussed above.
Most significantly, a due process strategy would actively involve
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See, e.g., Simmons, 791 N.W.2d at 89.
Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984).
Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963).
United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667 (1985).
Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986).
Purkett v. Elem, 514 U.S. 765 (1995).
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the reform movement’s most powerful allies: the people engaged in
participatory defense. Amplifying the voices of the most important
stakeholders in the reform struggle promotes the fundamental due
process right to be heard.
This strategy also increases the
transparency and accountability that are necessary for sustainable
improvement not only in indigent defense systems themselves, but
also in right to counsel doctrines that tend historically to emerge
from in-the-trenches praxis.
Part VI dives into that practical application of this article’s
doctrinal and theoretical analysis. As discussed below, innovative
empirical research offers new sources of support for reform
advocates by amplifying the voices of people who face criminal
charges along with the voices of their families and communities.
VI. “WHERE WAS I AT?!” PARTICIPATORY DEFENSE AND PRACTICAL
TOOLS FOR REFORM
This article argues that participatory defense is a powerful new
model for vindicating the due process right to be heard through
public defense reform. Participatory defense demonstrates that
some of the most important agents for change are the people with
the most skin in the game: people facing charges, their families, and
their communities. This Part offers practical tools for helping these
stakeholders to understand the rights triggered by criminal charges
and lawyers’ corresponding duties. By using those tools, these key
stakeholders will be in a better position to support lawyers’
demands for the time and resources necessary to fulfill their ethical
and legal obligations.
An easy way to amplify stakeholder voices is through rightsinformation and satisfaction-feedback procedures.
This Part
discusses two examples studied in Ohio and Indiana. The first was
implemented through the Indigent Defense Clinic (IDC) at the
University of Cincinnati College of Law. The IDC partners with the
local public defender’s office to provide every client with a succinct
statement of the attorney’s duties to communicate, investigate, and
advocate. A wallet-size, trifold rights-information card is below.
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The same jurisdiction successfully beta-tested a client satisfaction
survey, which probed the extent to which indigent defendants
understood their rights and counsel’s efforts to fulfill corresponding
duties.129 The results of that research were sufficiently revealing
that other jurisdictions agreed to serve as sites for broader
implementation of the protocol.
The project relied on prior empirical research that highlights the
importance of client trust in the criminal defense setting not only
for attorney-client cooperation, but also for perceptions of system
legitimacy and willingness to comply with the law.130 The project
included qualitative and quantitative analysis. A convenience
sample of volunteers was drawn from people represented by the
Hamilton County, Ohio, public defender’s office. The qualitative
analysis involved a small focus group discussion, while the
quantitative analysis relied upon surveys.131
At about the same time, a similar study was conducted with a
public defender agency in a rural Indiana county. For this project,
everyone who had a public defender assigned to a current case was
invited to participate in the study and respond to questions
regarding satisfaction with counsel. The overwhelming majority of
129 Campbell, C., Moore, J., Maier, W., & Gaffney, M. (in press). Unnoticed, untapped, and
underappreciated: Clients’ perceptions of their public defenders. Behavioral Sciences and the
Law.
130 See, e.g., Boccaccini, M. T., Boothby, J. L., & Brodsky, S. L. (2004). Development and
effects of client trust in criminal defense attorneys: Preliminary examination of the
congruence model of trust development. Behavioral Sciences and the Law, 22, 197–214; Tyler,
T. R., Braga, A., Fagan, J., Meares, T., Sampson, R., & Winship, C. (2007). Legitimacy and
criminal justice: International perspectives. In A. Braga, J. Fagan, T. Meares, R. Sampson, T.
R. Tyler, & C. Winship (Eds.), Legitimacy and criminal justice (pp. 9–30). New York, NY:
Russell Sage.
131 Campbell, Moore, Maier, & Gaffney, supra note 129.
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those who agreed to participate were in jail, awaiting case
disposition. Participants were administered a questionnaire, oneon-one, in individualized visiting rooms at the beginning of their
cases (T1). A second round of postdisposition (T2) surveys is
underway.
The research results, regardless of jurisdiction, underscore the
important ways that communication between people facing charges
and their lawyers affects the charged individuals’ level of
satisfaction with the relationship and the process, as well as their
perceptions of system fairness and legitimacy. The research also
reveals that amplifying the voices of the most important
stakeholders in the struggle for public defense reform—the people
facing charges and incarceration—can provide new evidence and
other support for reform advocacy.
A. Focus Group Discussions: Ohio
Comments from the Ohio focus group discussions reveal a sharp
awareness that indigent defense attorneys are overworked and
underresourced. One participant acknowledged that his public
defender was “not making as much money” as private attorneys
despite “a caseload that’s ridiculous,” and that his lawyer simply
didn’t “have the time . . . to put into an individual.”132 Another
participant put it bluntly: “There’s not enough of ’em to go around to
all the guys that can’t afford attorneys so they’re using one public
defender for a whole pile of people.”133
Participants were equally clear about the effects of system
overload and, in some instances, defenders who appeared less than
fully engaged, particularly with respect to attorney-client
communication. One individual stated, “I feel like I was sold. I was
sold to the judge. . . . We didn’t really sit down and talk about this
case or nothing. Next thing I know when I came to court—‘sign
this,’ which says ‘no contest.’”134 The same person contrasted the
experience of being “sold” to what he would have expected from a
“paid lawyer”:
“You pay for this time, so what you want to do?” “I wanna do
this.” He gonna sit back and listen. He ain’t gonna say
nothing to you. He’s going to sit back and say nothing and
after you tell him what’s going on, he’s gonna tell you our
132
133
134

Ibid.
Ibid.
Ibid.
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best route. . . . Public defender ain’t gonna do that.135
Still another participant expressly equated the lack of
communication and advocacy with the lack of due process:
Again, my statement is due process and equal justice under
the law. I mean come on, man. I understand I don’t have
the money to pay for this lawyer, and the state’s payin’ it,
but I still deserve to be treated like anybody else . . . black,
white, rich, yellow, it doesn’t matter . . . . Fair is fair. And
you all want me to state that I’m willing to give you the
maximum where this other guy comes in with a paid lawyer,
he gets probation. Wait a minute, hold up, back up.136
Yet another focus group participant linked the core duties to
communicate, investigate, and advocate:
Will one of them take the time and say that, this is what I
see we can do? Come to the cell block, talk to me and say,
“Uh, ok, what happened here?” Have me explain exactly
what happened, so he can get an idea of “Hey, I might
actually have something to work with here.” That don’t
happen.137
In a similar vein, one of the most poignant participant statements
described the attorney-client relationship as an absence or erasure:
Once they see what you in there for, they already know, they
just come down there with a paper and it’s got your name on
it, all your charges, all your history on it, and he’s tellin’ you,
“We gonna plead this.” Wait a minute, dude, we ain’t even
talk. “And if we plead this the judge already said that he
would do this.” When did that happen?! Where was I at?! 138
B. Perceptions of the Ideal Attorney: Indiana
The project in Indiana did not include a focus group.139 Instead,
Ibid.
Ibid.
137 Ibid.
138 Ibid.
139 There was an attempt to conduct a focus group, as part of a class project, in order for
people who were facing charges to have input in developing the data collection
instruments. The attempt was unsuccessful because the invitees failed to attend the
scheduled meeting with the students. Instead, Sandys took groups of students to the jail and
met with pretrial detainees, one detainee at a time, to review the questionnaires. The
primary purpose of those discussions was to determine whether the proposed instruments
covered all aspects of attorney-client satisfaction, whether there were any additional
questions that should be asked, and whether any of the questions were confusing or needed to
be clarified.
135
136
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participants in the Indiana study were asked to describe the ideal
attorney. Their responses fell squarely within the duties of an
attorney to communicate, investigate, and advocate. For example,
the very first client interviewed responded that the ideal attorney
would “fight for me, not the county.” In that simple sentence, the
client expresses the importance of having an attorney who is a true
advocate. That sentiment was echoed by another client, who
described the ideal attorney as “someone that’s going to be on my
side and fight for what’s in my best interests.” Another client went
straight to the point: “Fight for me, try hard. Don’t just take the
first offer. Be an advocate.”
While the participants in Indiana did not mention the term
investigation specifically, several of them pointed to the importance
of attorneys being familiar with the case. For example, one client
noted that an ideal attorney would “have knowledge of my case,
have helpful information pertaining to me and my case.” Another
person said that an ideal attorney “takes time getting to know the
case.” Likewise, another person pointed to the importance of
“pay[ing] attention to what the case entails, listen[ing] to the story,
facts, circumstances.”
Interestingly, several of the people with whom Marla Sandys, a
coauthor of this article, spoke referenced paid attorneys in their
descriptions of an ideal attorney. This fact is noteworthy because
the survey question asked for a description of an ideal attorney; it
did not ask for descriptions of an ideal public defender. Yet
regardless of the precise framing of the question, several
respondents provided their description of an ideal attorney as one
who is paid for quality services. In the words of these respondents,
such an attorney would:
Do everything they can do for me, just like a paid lawyer
would. . . . Be on the ball with things, act like case was
important, treat it the same as if they were being paid
privately. . . . Care[] like a paid attorney, [be] concerned . . .
tend to my case like he is paid.
Even more respondents, however, referenced the duty to
communicate in their descriptions of an ideal attorney. In the view
of these respondents, such a lawyer:
Comes to see me in a timely fashion; keeps me wellinformed; takes notes, [and] acts interested. . . . Would just
get back to you and let you know status of [your] case.
[Would come] see you once in a while to let you know what’s
going on. . . . Get[s] a hold of me, keep[s] me informed, let[s]
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me know what’s going to happen good or bad.
Yet another participant succinctly expressed the ethical duty of
zealous advocacy by describing the ideal lawyer as “[s]omeone that
listens and tries to understand [the] situation; [is] not afraid to fight
for you in court.”
C. Survey Results
A sample of 156 survey respondents was obtained in Ohio after
reaching out to 568 clients through mail, telephone, and on-site
distribution. The survey did not closely examine the connection
between client experience, client satisfaction, and case outcome.
While further research on this point is needed, prior analyses
indicate a weak connection between satisfaction and outcome.140
Instead, the variables focused on the extent to which clients felt
their voices were heard.141
The resulting “client-centered representation scale” tended to
corroborate the focus group reports. Client satisfaction was most
closely linked with the extent to which attorneys listened to the
clients, sought client input, investigated cases, and informed clients
about case progress and possible consequences.142 A majority
(52.6%) of surveyed clients reported overall satisfaction with their
public defenders’ performance.143
Curiously, even larger
percentages (63%) reported on one hand that they were not asked
for their views on the issues in their cases, but on the other, that
they felt their lawyers did investigate their cases.144
The findings from Indiana are similar even though those initial
(T1) interviews were conducted while the case was ongoing. That is,
findings from the T1 interviews in Indiana reveal what clients
experience early on in their relationship with their attorney,
whereas the findings from Ohio reflect experiences after the case
was resolved.
Overall, at T1 the Indiana clients also were satisfied with their
attorney (mean = 3.98 on 10-point scale with low numbers
indicating greater satisfaction). Moreover, the clients expressed the
greatest agreement with items that tapped into communication (“I
want my lawyer to bring me every plea offer” and “it is important to
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Ibid. (citing Tyler et al., supra note 130).
Campbell, Moore, Maier, & Gaffney, supra note 129.
Ibid.
Ibid. at tbl. 3.
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me to know step-by-step what is going to happen in my case”) and
being heard (“It is important that my lawyer listen to my story”).
One of the more interesting apparent anomalies to emerge across
jurisdictions is the disconnect between consultation and
investigation. While clients believe that their cases are being
investigated, they also express concern that they are not consulted
throughout the case. One explanation for this apparent anomaly
may be a perceived distinction among survey respondents between
consultation about the issues before and after investigation occurs,
or between investigation and the plea bargaining or case resolution
phases. Or, more generally, it may be that participants were
uncertain as to what constitutes investigating a case. Granted,
when cases go to trial, people who are facing charges should have
had an opportunity to understand the evidence against them and to
know the defense strategy. In contrast, in the vast majority of cases
that are plea bargained, they may hear an offer but may be
unaware of any investigation that went into securing that offer.
Such questions, along with the small sample size and early phase
of data assessment, concededly warrant cautious interpretation and
application of the research results. The fact that similar findings
emerged regardless of jurisdiction, or stage of the case at which the
interview was conducted, nevertheless suggests that investigating
the role of client voice in a client-centered indigent defense setting
warrants expansion through further research.
At minimum, the results suggest that indigent defendants who
understand what the investigative process should look like, and who
are communicating effectively with their attorneys, may be more
likely to be satisfied with the representation that they received. It
may also be true that the quality of representation under those
circumstances will in turn be improved. It also is possible that
when people who are facing charges are empowered with knowledge
of their rights during the critical communication and investigation
stages, they may be better positioned to make their voices heard in
the ongoing struggle to improve indigent defense systems.
VII. CONCLUSION
Participatory defense is a powerful new model for pursuing
criminal justice reform generally and public defense reform
specifically. The model is a crucial tool for expanding the due
process right to be heard in criminal courts. That right is
vindicated in part through communication between people who face
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charges and their lawyers. That communication is a necessary
foundation for fulfilling the related rights and duties of
investigation and advocacy. Findings from studies in Ohio and
Indiana reveal that people facing charges want, above all,
substantive communication with their lawyers.
The participatory defense model harnesses that energy and offers
an effective way to improve defense performance and, in turn, the
governing legal standards that courts draw from in-the-trenches
practice. Improved defense standards also can gradually rebalance
skewed power disparities and strengthen diminishing cognate
rights such as the right to jury trial. Thus, by making a new and
powerful set of voices heard, participatory defense is an important
mode of grassroots lawmaking that can force greater transparency,
accountability, and fairness from criminal justice systems while
reducing the footprint of the carceral state.

